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Gods, Forms, and Socratic Piety 
Yukio Kachi 
The recent resurgence in Socratic scholarship has been rather unconcerned with 
the religious dimension of Socrates' thought. Yet there can be no doubt that there is 
such a dimension, and that it is significant to his philosophy. After all, Socrates was 
tried and found guilty of impiety. Moreover, Aristophanes' Socrates replaced Zeus 
with the new divinities of clouds and the convection principle. Xenophon's Socrates, 
the paragon of traditional piety, propounded a theistic cosmology. Plato's Socrates 
declared that to abandon philosophy would be to violate a divine command. So there 
is no reason to emulate Aristotle's silence on the topic of piety in his accounts of 
Socrates, and James Beckman's study, The Religious Dimension of Socrates' 
Thought, is a welcome attempt to fill this lacuna in recent scholarship.' The book is 
intended, however, not only for the student of Greek philosophy and culture but also 
for the general reader concerned with questions of religion, morals, and psychology. 
Much of the scholarly detail is relegated to extensive footnotes and appendices. There 
is also a glossary of Greek terms. 
To elucidate the religious dimension of Socratic philosophy, Beckman examines 
the evidence for the historical Socrates, the passages of religious import in Plato's 
early dialogues, and the position of Socratic philosophy within the ebb and flow of the 
Greek experience of life. 
In the first and preliminary chapter, Beckman examines the standard Socratic 
literature of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. and concludes that in Plato's early 
dialogues we have the only reliable representation of Socratic philosophy in action. 
According to Beckman, the Socraticism of the early dialogues can be satisfactorily 
distinguished from the Platonism of the middle dialogues. Socrates was innocent of 
Plato's reified conception of the soul and his other-worldly orientation. For Plato, 
according to Beckman, the intellectual apprehension of transcendent Forms was 
possible only for the disembodied soul, whereas for Socrates this apprehension was 
possible for man in this world (p. 32). Furthermore, Plato supplanted Socrates' irony 
and professed ignorance with a mythical, or metaphorical, kind of knowledge (p. 31). 
One wonders if Beckman does not also regard Plato's theoretical proclivity towards a 
posthumous triumph as a myth or metaphor. 
In the next chapter, Beckman examines Socrates' religious or theological 
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utterances and arguments in the early dialogues so as to reconstruct his conception of 
religion. Among the early dialogues, Beckman focuses his attention on theE uthyphro 
and Apology. They are of unique value to his enquiry, the former because of its topic, 
piety, and the latter because of Socrates' defense against the charge of impiety and his 
positive characterization of his philosophical activity as a religious mission. 
Construing the dramatic sequence - the Euthyphro before the Apology - as the 
intended pedagogic sequence, Beckman interprets the Apology in the light of the 
Euthyphro but, unfortunately, not vice versa as well. As a result he does not consider, 
for instance, Euthyphro's definition of piety as the tendance (Euthphr. 13b) or service 
(I 3d) of the gods in the light of Socrates' own characterization of his philosophical 
activity as service to the god (Ap. 30a). Nor does Beckman reflect on Socrates' 
description of Euthyphro as a soothsayer (Euthphr. 3e) in the light of Socrates' 
observation that poets, like diviners and soothsayers, say many fine things without 
knowing whereofthey speak (Ap. 22c). Beckman is precluded from comparing these 
Socratic observations and the E uthyphronic formulae of piety by his theses that piety 
cannot be defined in terms of the gods, and that philosophy can be adequately 
characterized without reference to them. Euthyphro proposes to define piety 
variously as "what all the gods love" (Euthphr. ge), "the tendance of the gods" (12e), 
"a kind of service to the gods" (13d), and "the art of business transaction between 
gods and men" (l4e). But if, as Beckman holds, all these formulae fail in the last 
analysis because they involve reference to the gods, they cannot illuminate what 
Socrates says of piety in the Apology. 
Beckman's argument for the dispensability of the gods and the indefinability of 
piety in terms of them is as follows: Socrates is a seeker of wisdom and virtue. The 
conduct of his philosophical vocation is informed by a profound religious sense. But 
this sense is not rooted in his worship of the gods: the gods are superfluous to Socrates 
for whom the Forms of the virtues, including piety, suffice. If there are gods, they are 
what they are just because they exemplify the appropriate Forms perfectly. Thus, 
these Forms, of which piety is one, are logically prior to the gods. Hence, piety cannot 
be defined in terms of the gods, either as the service to them or as the worshipful 
obedience to their command (pp. 50, 52). 
The claim that the Forms have replaced the gods underlies Beckman's central 
thesis that Socrates identifies religion and philosophy. They are not two compartments 
existing side by side. Nor is one prior to the other, as a purely naturalistic world-view 
would envisage, or as the theistic grounding of philosophy would imply (pp. 42-3, 68-
9). Instead, philosophy and religion are thoroughly integrated. "In short, Socrates' 
philosophical way is . . . a fundamentally religious, though nonsupematural, 
experience of the world" (p. 43). 
In the third and final chapter, Beckman goes beyond Socrates' positive view of 
religion to that negative dimension of his philosophy which takes the highly 
idiosyncratic forms of irony, profession of ignorance, and silence. The question, as he 
puts it, is: "what was Socrates' real mind behind the facade of irony and ignorance?" 
(p. 118) According to Beckman, Plato answered this question when he supplanted 
Socrates' irony and profession of ignorance with sublime mysteries of beholding 
transcendent Forms. In the myth of the ascent of the winged charioteer and steeds to 
the vision of Forms in the Phaedrus (246a-248e) and in Diotima' s speech initiating 
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Socrates into the holy contemplation of the Beautiful itself in the Symposium (20ge-
212a), "Plato has given expression to the truth which Socratic irony concealed: the 
Socratic \l'ay H'as a religious initiation or passage through the philosophical A.6yo<; 
to the vision of [he Form as a sublime mystery" (p, 175). 
Beckman seems to be saying here that Plato revealed what Socrates resolutely 
concealed from the uninitiated. But if Socrates was committed to this concealment, he 
must have been equally committed, however implicitly, to that which he was 
concealing, And is what he was concealing the sublime mysteries of beholding 
transcendent Forms? Beckman himself denies this by implication when he writes 
(pp.31-2): 
In his new-found quasi-religious" enthusiasm" for the proposition 
, .. that there was a realm in which the Forms stood as the objects 
of the deepest intellectual and spiritual aspirations of the human 
soul, Plato fired man with the prospect of transcending the human 
condition, of attaining a pure and sublime beholding of these 
eternal realities. In thus lending positivity to this separate world of 
the eternal Forms beyond bodily existence, Plato, through his 
religious excess, had jeopardized Socrates' life-stand on the 
"ignorant" finitude of the human condition. 
Beckman's observation here raises a question: Did Plato inject the religious moment 
of initiation and contemplation into Socrates' agnosticism, or did he merely reveal 
that moment which Socrates held secretly? Beckman, it seems, is trying to have it both 
ways. 
I would like to comment briefly on a few particulars involved in Beckman's 
interpretation of his general thesis that Socrates integrated religion and philosophy. 
My positive theses in the following comments will have to be substantiated elsewhere. 
1. A re Socratic Forms "separate''? With R. E. Allen and against W. D. Ross and 
others, Beckman claims that Socratic Forms (that is, the Forms in Plato's early 
dialogues) are metaphysically separate from their instances. He uses this claim to 
argue that Socrates' recognition of the indescribability and indefmability of Forms, 
necessitated by their separation, accounts for his silence and irony (pp. 175-6), and 
that he replaced the Homeric gods with the separate Forms of the virtues (pp. 176-9). 
This claim involves several rather striking and very questionable theses: (i) that such 
locutions in the early dialogues as a Form being "in," "present" in, or "common" to 
particulars, and the particulars, in turn, "possessing" it or" sharing in" it should not be 
taken, as by Ross (Plato's Theory of Ideas ,2nd ed., p. 21), to indicate the immanence 
of Forms (pp. 235, 237); (ii) that the Socraticism of the early dialogues cannot be 
differentiated from the Platonism of the middle dialogues with respect to the 
ontological status of Forms (pp. 19, 241); (iii) that Aristotle was mistaken when he 
asserted (Met. 1078b30-2) that it was Plato, not Socrates, who separated Forms (p. 
241); and (iv) that even Socrates suffers from "the worst difficulty" of transcendence 
raised in the Parmenides, the problem of relating a Form to its instances (133-4). 
Even for him, this problem was the "ultimate metaphysical mystery" (p. 31). Thus 
Beckman tells us (p. 31): 
What was irresoluble about the Socratic theory of Forms, then, 
was the dialectical tension between, on the one hand, the 
affirmation of separateness of Forms from the world, and, on the 
other hand, the affirmation of the essential continuity or isomor-
phism between the Forms and their corresponding instances in the 
world. In the context of his philosophical ignorance Socrates could 
only accept such a dialectical tension as irresoluble. 
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2. Are the gods dispensable? Was Socrates an agnostic? For Socrates, gods 
were perfect personal exemplifications of wisdom and the virtues. From this 
Beckman argues that " to know about the gods was logically irrelevant to the 
definition" (p. 50) of the virtues. It does not however follow, as Beckman believes, 
that "the question of the gods was peripheral to his [Socrates' ] life's project" (p. 50). 
Beckman holds that Socrates was just as agnostic about the gods as he was about 
the afterlife, and that his tentative belief in the gods provided no more "foundation or 
motivation for the conduct of life" (p. 74) than did his hope about the afterlife. Thus, 
regarding the divinity manifested in the oracle, Beckman observes (p. 74): 
He [Socrates] perceived the truth of the Oracle and took it to be 
divine. The God whence this truth came was the bearer of divine 
wisdom. To paraphrase Socrates' attitude, "there may indeed be a 
personal God such as the myths have maintained for as long as we 
can remember. This is not something I know, but I know that the 
non-existence of such a God is also something I don't know. And 
though I cannot pretend to know anything about such a God I may 
nonetheless plausibly, conjecturally posit such a divine being ... " 
The expression of agnosticism about the gods which Beckman attributes to Socrates 
here contrasts sharply with Socrates' own assertion to the judges: "I do believe in the 
gods ... as none of my accusers does" (Ap. 3 5d). The clause" as none of my accusers 
does" indicates not how tentative his belief is but how fundamental a role his belief in 
the gods plays in his conduct of life. Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon may pay lip service 
to the gods, but their conduct is essentially impious. Socrates' conduct, in contrast, is 
pious. He tries to make sure that every act of his conforms to his positive belief in the 
gods. Here at Apology 35d he says he will not entreat the judges to acquit him 
because such an act would be inconsistent with his belief in the gods. 
To be sure, Socrates' gods are not the same as Homer's. There are significant 
similarities and dissimilarities between them, as will be noted shortly, and this fact 
complicates Beckman's question whether Socrates believes in "a personal God such 
as the myths have maintained." Be that as it may, there is no question but that 
Socrates has the deepest allegiance to the gods as he conceives of them. For him, as 
we have seen, gods are perfect personal exemplifications of wisdom and the virtues. 
They necessarily embody in their intellect, character, and conduct the optimum state 
for man. Thus to be a god is an ideal. To believe in a god is to acknowledge and aspire 
to this ideal. It is to live one's life sustained and directed by that aspiration. Piety 
consists in the belief in the gods in this sense. 
3. Is piety logically independent of the gods? Are the gods pious? As we have 
noted, it is Beckman's basic contention that, since a god is a god because he is, among 
other things, perfectly pious, divinity is to be defmed in terms of piety, not vice versa . 
Thus, regarding Euthyphro's defmition of holiness as "what all the gods love" 
(Euthphr. ge), Beckman observes that he "has failed because he attempted to defme 
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the holy in tenns of the gods" (p. 49). Socrates' explanation of why this definition 
fails, however, is not that it refers to the gods, but that it gives only a Jto80<; instead of 
the OUOla of the holy ( 11 a-b). 
Beckman's argument for the indefinability of the holy in tenns of the gods is as 
follows: 
. . . he [Euthyphro] failed because he did not realize the 
implications of Socrates' conception of the £I&o<; or I.&£a, the holy 
in and by itself. The holy, as indeed every F onn of a virtue, is what 
it is absolutely, without qualification. They do not depend on any 
other thing or person for what they are (which is not to settle the 
question as to whether one F onn is defmed in tenns of another 
F onn). Their OUOla does not depend on any existent thing for its 
being what it is. They are from this point of view logical simples, or 
logical ultimates. The discussion in the Euthyphro has helped to 
make clear what is implicit in the Socratic first principles. The 
holy, and all the F onns, are logically prior to the gods (pp. 49-50). 
Piety is logically prior to the gods in the sense that the piety of the pious act is not 
constituted by the gods' favorable attitude towards the act. The priority in question 
should not be taken, however, as it is by Beckman, to deny that piety is essentially 
man's relationship to the gods. In proceeding as he does, Beckman is relying on the 
general thesis that no reference to anything concrete can be made in the definition of a 
F onn. According to this thesis, no F onn can be a relation having things or persons as 
its relata. But then courage in and by itself could not be defmed, as it was by Socrates 
himself, as "knowledge of what is to be feared and what is not" (Prot. 360d, cf. Lach. 
196d), because the knowledge in question is implicitly of appropriate objects offear in 
concrete situations. Since, as Beckman acknowledges, the object of Socratic 
knowledge was "the concrete moral life of man in this world" (p. 32), and Socratic 
virtue was definable in tenns of Socratic knowledge, Beckman's view has the 
consequence that none of the Socratic virtues is definable. It is therefore no accident 
that he does not recognize Socrates' defmition of courage (p. 176, n. 66) but asserts 
that "the £I&o<; resisted every effort to give it linguistic, defmitional fonn" (p. 176). 
The fact of the matter is that, in what Socrates says about the Fonn of holiness, there 
is nothing which precludes reference to the gods in its definition. As Beckman himself 
says, "Both 'to OOU)V and 'to t:Um:ot<; imply some relationship to the gods" (p. 45), 
and this traditional implication is in no way denied by Socrates' expressions 'to OOU)V 
au'to (Euthphr. 5d2) and au'to 'to £I&o<; (6dlO-ll). All that au'to here connotes is 
that 'to OOLOV is an objective reality distinct from 'ta &:n.a and independent of human 
opinion and divine attitude. 
If piety is indeed an essential attribute of a god, however, it would still follow that 
piety is logically prior to the gods and hence indefmable in tenns of them. But, 
contrary to Beckman, I believe - and he gives no reason to believe otherwise - that, for 
Socrates, piety is not a divine attribute. True, a god, for Socrates, can be said to b€: 
8Eio<; (Phdr. 249c6) and o0<p6<; (Ap. 23a6), but not, I suspect, OOLO<; or t:UOE:oij<;. 
True, wisdom and the virtues constitute divinity, but piety is not among those virtues. 
It is not, for the same reason that philosophy is not. Philosophy is, for Socrates, that 
aspiration for self-perfection which the gods, the ultimately wise, do not possess. 
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piety is, for Socrates, the dedication to that inner calling for self-perfection to which 
the gods, the ultimately excellent, are not subject. Thus, philosophy and piety do fuse 
into one, but the gods cannot be said to be philosophical or pious. 
Let us relate this Socratic fusion of philosophy and piety to the Homeric outlook 
on life, following Beckman's insights and orientation, but also taking into account the 
disagreements with him. By doing so we shall be able to see in what ways Socrates 
was a reformer and a preserver of Homeric perspectives on values, especially on 
piety. 
Beckman develops an immensely interesting assessment of the historical 
significance of Socrates' religious and philosophical project against the background of 
the Homeric tradition and its crisis late in the fifth century B.C. (pp.132-18l ). Here is 
his assessment in outline: Homeric valuation contained two divergent perspectives, 
that of the individual and that of society. The former depicted excellence as consisting 
of "competitive virtues" like might, valor, and resourcefulness, while the latter 
inculcated " quiet" or "cooperative virtues" like justice or temperance. The 
competitive virtues enable one to flourish and prosper, while the quiet virtues are 
internalized social constraints (p. 162). The Homeric gods exemplified the former 
and sanctioned the latter. One was to pursue one's personal prosperity within the 
limits of justice sanctioned by the gods (pp. 156-7). But in the latter half of the fIfth 
century this Homeric synthesis disintegrated. Divine sanction broke down, and 
considerations of righteousness and piety became incidental and peripheral (pp. 162-
70). In this moral and religious crisis, the problem confronting Socrates was how to 
overcome the radical disharmony between the competitive and cooperative virtues. 
He responded by collapsing the two value systems into one, that of personal 
excellence and power, which he elevated to the intellectual apprehension of the 
supreme values (pp. 170-1). Here is the upshot of Beckman's account (p. 179): 
Socrates' radical recasting of the tradition had two main thrusts. 
First, to resolve an inherent antinomy in the old synthesis, and 
second, to sublimate it from the level of mere experience ... to the 
level of philosophical insight. Divine transcendence was reinter-
preted in terms of the pure, divine, eternal reality of the Forms, 
which represented at once the metaphysical essence or reality of 
the world and the ideal end or goal of human activity. The same 
profound attitudes of traditional religion were translated to these 
objects of philosophical inquiry. They constituted the supreme 
access given to a mortal human being to that realm of open, 
transcendent mystery within which human life was lived. 
Against Beckman I have maintained the following theses: first, if, for Socrates, 
Forms are distinct but not separate from their instances, the mysteries of contemplat-
ing separate Forms are not Socratic but Platonic. Second, Socrates was far from 
being agnostic; his belief in the gods as perfect personal exemplifications of wisdom 
and the virtues was unqualifIed and played the central role in his tife. Third, in the 
conceptual matrix of the Homeric tradition, piety is not logically independent of the 
gods, for it concerns man's relationship to the gods. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
in the early dialogues that the gods themselves can be said to be pious or impious. 
Therefore, although Socrates modifIed the Homeric conception of a god, he retained 
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the conceptual link between piety and divinity. These theses are consistent with and 
can be integrated into much of Beckman's analysis and evaluation of Socrates' 
historical role. What follows is a sketch of how I propose to effect this integration. 
Socrates unified the two divergent evaluative systems of the Homeric tradition by 
reinterpreting the quiet virtues on the model of health. The quiet virtues were no 
longer a matter of moral constraints on one's quest for self-interest; they were now the 
very object of one's quest. On realizing that one's actual condition is less than 
optimum, one will be motivated to attain the optimum state as a matter of vital 
necessity. Here Socratic eros and Socratic morality cooperate, and obligation and 
teleology come together. In conceiving this project of "the improvement of the soul," 
Socrates used the image of a god to symbolize the optimum state. Here he was 
drawing on the Homeric conception of a god as both the idealized possessor of the 
competitive virtues and the enforcer of the quiet virtues. He was also drawing on a 
fundamental assumption of Homeric anthropomorphism, the assumption that man is 
the adequate conceptual model for the divine (p. 145). Accordingly, the traditional 
piety as submissive reverence of the gods was transformed into devotion to the project 
of self-perfection. This transformation, however, left the logic of Homeric piety intact. 
Socratic piety was still the worshipful obedience to "the command of the god," and it 
was still "service to the gods," though, to be sure, not in Euthyphro's sense. It was, in 
Plato's words, ll{lo8'uf,l£ioem ... 6f,lOLOiio9m 9£(f>, "to be eager to be like a god" 
(Resp. 613b). Only the fmal object of pious aspiration shifted, from the gods to their 
divinity itself, namely, their wisdom and virtues. Divinity was not transcendent in the 
ontological sense. It was the very perfection of the perfected soul of man. 
In the conceptual network of Homeric values, piety or holiness is not in its own 
right one of the quiet, cooperative virtues. Rather, piety becomes a kind of 
comprehensive quiet virtue by association because the gods sanction the quiet virtues 
and piety consists in the sincere acknowledgment of such divine sanction. For this 
reason, unlike the other quiet virtues, piety characterizes man's relationship to the 
gods, and the gods themselves are not subject to the judgment of piety or impiety. 
When Socrates united the competitive and quiet virtues, he retained these unique 
conceptual features of Homeric piety. As a result, for Socrates, piety was not one of 
the virtues constitutive of divinity just as philosophy, the quest for wisdom, was not an 
ingredient of divinity. As philosophy was to wisdom, so was piety to divinity. But 
since wisdom and divinity were one, so were philosophy and piety. 
Despite my disagreements and strictures, the indebtedness of this account to 
Beckman is obvious. His book is insightful, thoughtful, and energetic. It is not possible 
to read it without deepening one's understanding of the Apology and Euthyphro, or 
without being provoked to think further about Socrates' mission against the 
background of Greek life. In short, it is a significant contribution to classical 
scholarship and an indispensable discussion of the religious dimension in Socrates' 
thought.2 
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